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Abstract In this paper we reply to the most important
objections to our advocacy of moral enhancement by
biomedical means – moral bioenhancement – that John
Harris advances in his new bookHow to beGood. These
objections are to effect that such moral enhancement
undercuts both moral reasoning and freedom. The latter
objection is directed more specifically at what we have
called the God Machine, a super-duper computer which
predicts our decisions and prevents decisions to
perpertrate morally atrocious acts. In reply, we argue
first that effective moral bioenhancement presupposes
moral reasoning rather than undermines it. Secondly,
that the God Machine would leave us with extensive
freedom and that the restrictions it imposes on it are
morally justified by the prevention of harm to victims.
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Over the years John Harris has been one of the
most persistent critics of our advocacy of moral
bioenhancement (MB), i.e. moral enhancement by bio-
medical means. Eventually, he has however come
around to the view that our disagreement might not be
all that extensive: ‘I do not think P&S and I are, all
things considered, so far apart… I have no antipathy at
all to moral enhancement per se’ ([1]: 140). The dis-
agreement between us seems to boil down to the fact
that he sees MB as a greater threat than we do to ‘the
survival of either liberty or …the survival of rational
strategies for seeing that good triumphs Ball things
considered^’ ([1]: 139). In other words, his fear is
greater that MB will undermine our freedom of choice
and action and bypass moral deliberation or reflection
on what is best all things considered. We believe that his
fears on both counts are overblown, though we do not
doubt that MB – like scientific technologies in general –
could be so administered that his fear turns out to be
justified.
Harris does not seem to see the need for moti-
vating emotions alongside moral judgement in or-
der to produce moral action. For instance, if I find
myself failing to feel much sympathy with the
global poor, he writes that I ‘may need some help
in feeling sympathy, but that is a different problem
and not … a moral one’ ([1]: 116). ‘I just have to
know what’s right and to know that I ought to do what’s
right’ ([1]: 116). Enhancement of sympathy, he claims,
is ‘ethically otiose’ ([1]: 115). It all sounds as though he
is adopting the Socratic view that if you know what is
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Nevertheless, he recognizes that there is the problem
of weakness of will, which consists precisely in failing
to do what one is convinced that one ought to do, but he
tries to write it off with metaphors: this ‘problem is not
one that requires moral enhancement but something
akin to Bstiffening the sinews^ and Bsummoning up
the blood^ ([1]: 116). So far as we can understand, these
metaphors must be cashed out in motivational terms, for
clearly the problem of weakness of will is a problem of
motivation: it occurs because we are not sufficiently
motivated to do what we are convinced that we ought
to do, for instance, we do not feel sufficient sympathy
for the global poor to aid themwhenwe come up against
temptations to satisfy our self-regarding desires. To
enhance the capacity to feel such sympathy would be
to enhance the probability that we do what we believe
that we ought. This is an instance of moral enhance-
ment, according to our view.
People who fall victim to weakness of will have some
motivation to do what they think they ought; their
problem is that this motivation is not strong enough to
prevail in the face of opposing desires. Some people – at
the psychopathic end of the spectrum – apparently feel
no sympathy for the plight of others, though they may
be intellectually aware that they ought to help. These
people stand in even greater need of moral enhancement
in our sense: a strengthening of their moral motivation,
like their capacity for sympathy or altruism.
Certainly, a strong capacity to feel sympathy is not all
it takes to act morally: sympathy is often misdirected,
too much focussed on the suffering that is present to our
senses at the expense of what is spatio-temporally dis-
tant. Sound moral judgement about what is best all
things considered is needed as well. But we do not see
why a strong capacity for sympathy has to overturn, or
bypass moral judgements, as Harris obviously fears; we
think that reasoned judgements and an adequate moti-
vational response in light of them are both necessary for
moral action. When he describes enhancement of pro-
social attitudes like sympathy as ‘designed to bypass
reasoning and act directly on attitudes’ ([1]: 81), it
seems that he thinks that such enhancement will result
in waves of sympathy welling up within us irrespective
of whether or not we have reasons to feel sympathy. But
that is a misconception: we take enhancement of the
capacity to feel sympathy as meaning being capable of
feeling more sympathy in response to reasons for it.
Like Harris ([1]: 116), we recognize that sympathy is
necessarily a reaction to some (considered) state of
affairs like somebody’s suffering; it is sympathy for
the suffering. If a biomedical means like a drug were
to ‘cloud’ ([1]: 79) or ‘reduce’ (2016) consideration of
such states of affairs it could not possibly enhance the
capacity for sympathy.
To sum up, it seems to us that if Harris were to cash
out the metaphors quoted above, he would land in our
position that moral enhancement in the sense of en-
hancement of moral motivation is necessary to make
us act morally more often. Enhancement of moral mo-
tivation is not inimical to reasoned judgements about
morally relevant matters, like suffering, but rather pre-
supposes them. We have hypothesized that biomedical
means may be effective in producing such moral en-
hancement because at least some moral motivation, like
the capacity for sympathy or altruism, appears to be
biologically based. In support of this hypothesis, we
referred to the fact that women in general have this
capacity to a greater degree than men. On the basis of
this, we suggested thatMB could consist in makingmen
in general more like women in general in respect of the
capacity for sympathy ([2]: 111–2).
Without acknowledging any awareness of our prior
discussion, Harris proposes a ‘radical feminization of
men’ ([1]: 85) as a way of achieving moral enhance-
ment. He contends – as we also explicitly did ([2]: 116) –
that this would not make men less free because ‘we have
no reason to think that human women are less free than
their male counterparts’ ([1]: 88). But, amazingly, he
concludes that ‘the research evidence’ in favour of his
proposal ‘is considerably more robust’ than it is for what
we call MB ([1]: 89). However, what he has proposed is
MB in our sense, albeit of a rather crude sort and an
example we cited of it.
To conclude, Harris has come to realize that, with
respect to his view is not so different from ours. We
believe that if he had read us more closely, he would
have seen that the differences are even smaller than he
thinks. The disagreement between us is however more
substantial with respect to some thought experiments of
ours which do not exactly exemplify MB. Here is one of
them, based on a famous paper by Harry Frankfurt [3]:
Imagine that you decide to do the morally right
thing on the basis of considering reasons for and
against, as somebody who is morally responsible
is supposed to do. Imagine, however, that there is
a freaky mechanism in your brain which would
have kicked in if you had been in the process of
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making, not this decision, but a decision to do
something which is morally wrong. The mecha-
nism would then irresistibly have made you de-
cide to do the morally right thing. Hence, you are
not free to fall, i.e. you cannot avoid deciding to
do the morally right thing. Would the presence of
this freaky mechanism then mean that you are not
praiseworthy for making the right decision? It is
hard to see why it would: after all, the mechanism
was never called into operation; it remained idle.
In fact, you decided to do the morally right thing
for precisely the same reasons as someone whose
brain does not feature the freakymechanism could
do, and whose praiseworthiness therefore is not in
doubt. It seems plausible to think that what deter-
mines whether you are morally responsible and
praiseworthy is the actual occurrences that led up
to your decision, not some merely hypothetical
occurrences that could have led up to your deci-
sion, but in fact did not. Certainly, owing to the
presence of the freaky mechanism, you are not
free to decide to act immorally; this is not anything
you could do. ([2]: 114–5).
The freaky mechanism does not count as moral en-
hancement in our vocabulary, since it does not enhance
your motivation to do what is morally right. Rather, it
deprives you of your freedom – and even ability – to
decide to do and do what is wrong.
In reply, Harris writes that this situation is like being
in a room that you do not know is locked. Then ‘you
certainly would not be free to leave’ ([1]: 93). That is
true, but if you think falsely that you could leave, and
decide to stay, you decide freely to stay, and stay freely.
The fact that you cannot leave the room does not affect
your deliberation leading to the decision because you
are not conscious of it. Your mental state could be
precisely the same as it when you deliberate about
whether or not to leave the room believing truly that
you can leave it. Therefore, your deciding to stay and
staying is just as free in the former as in the latter case, in
which you really have the option of leaving the room.
Harris’s claim that you would not have freedom ‘of
choice and action’ ([1]: 94) in these circumstances is
then false: you not only freely choose to stay, but stay
freely.
This might be clearer if we imagine that you have no
belief about whether or not the door is locked, but could
get up and check. Suppose you decide not to do so
because you want to stay in the room in any case.
Then you doubtlessly refrained from checking the door
freely, since you could have checked it. But this implies
that you also stayed in the room freely: it would be
peculiar to hold that whether or not you stay freely
depends on whether or not the door is locked, which
you freely refrain from finding out.
Harris also writes that our view would ‘constitute the
definitive refutation of the idea that Bought implies
can^’, ([1]: 94) but it would not. We are not committed
to the view that it could be the case that you ought to
leave the room, though you cannot. We think, however,
that it could be true that you ought to stay – which you
can do – though the alternative of leaving or not staying
is not open to you, and that your staying could be free
and responsible under these conditions. In other words,
following Frankfurt, we are rejecting the principle of
alternate possibilities (PAP), that moral obligation, re-
sponsibility and freedom presupposes that you can act
otherwise than you in fact do.
We think that our intuitions both about the freaky
mechanism and the locked room support this rejection,
and Harris presents no reason to think otherwise. He
argues:
1. OiC /Ought implies Can/ is incompatible with de-
terminism…
and
2. Indeterminism implies PAP…
Then
3. Denying PAP also involves denying OiC. ([1]: 95)
This is curious argument for several reasons. To
begin with, it needs to be reformulated to assume the
form of a valid argument. We surmise that what Harris
has in mind in this. If OiC is incompatible with deter-
minism, it implies indeterminism (since they are exhaus-
tive alternatives). Now
1*. OiC implies indeterminism
and 2 imply
3*. OiC implies PAP,
and, by contraposition, this yields (3) if PAP is false
(denied), so is OiC.
However, although this reformulated argument is
logically valid, it would still be odd for Harris to ad-
vance it. For 1 (or 1*) is at odds with what he has earlier
declared: ‘I make no assumptions about the viability of a
non-deterministic account of free will and for what it’s
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worth think some version of compatibilism is probably
right’ ([1]: 79). But the first premise expresses the
incompatibilist view that moral obligation is incompat-
ible with determinism (or implies indeterminism). As a
compatibilist who, contra Frankfurt, endorses 3 (or 3*)
he should rather contend that PAP should be interpreted
in a way that renders it compatible with determinism,
e.g. that the fact we can act otherwise should be under-
stood conditionally, as amounting to the fact that we will
act otherwise if we decide to do so. If ‘can’ in OiC is
read along these lines, 1 is false.
In an adjunct footnote, he concedes accordingly that
this argument does not ‘leave open the possibility that a
compatibilist reading of OiC is possible’ ([1]: 95n). But
why does he suddenly assume incompatibilism when he
has earlier told us that he thinks that ‘some version of
compatibilism is probably right’? The explanation
might be that he assumes that those who defend a
compatibilist reading of OiC ‘cannot say that denying
PAP logically entails denying OiC’ ([1]: 95n), i.e. that
they cannot endorse 3. But that is a confusion: the only
thing they cannot consistently say is that denying PAP
incompatibilistically interpreted as involving a contra-
causal power to act otherwise entails denying OiC or, in
other words, that OiC entails PAP thus interpreted. They
can however consistently assert that there is a
compatibilist interpretation of PAP – indicated above –
according to which it is entailed by OiC (though they
might instead go along with Frankfurt’s denial of this
entailment).
All in all, Harris has given us no reason to believe,
contra Frankfurt, that 3 is true, i.e. that OiC implies PAP,
nor made it unequivocally clear whether he thinks that
PAP should be understood as being compatible with
determinism or as requiring indeterminism. In the inter-
est of clarity, we believe that he should have stuck to his
earlier declaration to stay clear of the compatibilism/
incompatibilism debate and concentrated on why he
thinks it false that the fact that we ought to do an action
entails that we have a dual power to act and to refrain
from acting, which is the crux in cases like that of the
freaky mechanism.
In another publication [4], we utilize the idea of this
mechanism to envisage a super-duper computer, the
God Machine (GM), which monitors all the mental
states of every human person, and is capable of modi-
fying them within nanoseconds, without the subject
noticing it. However, it intervenes only to prevent gross-
ly immoral behaviour, like murder, torture and rape. As
soon as it registers that someone is about to decide to
perform such an act, or immediately after such a deci-
sion has been made, it makes the subject change his or
her mind, or forget about the whole thing. Consequently,
people under the surveillance of GM would not be free
to perform such grossly immoral acts intentionally. (We
may also imagine that it prevents them from performing
such acts unintentionally.) It would however not inter-
fere with deliberation issuing in immoral behaviour on a
smaller scale, like petty larceny (let alone deliberation
issuing in moral behaviour). The point of this restriction
is that GM’s interference with people’s freedom, as
such, is something bad which can be justified only if a
greater bad – like someone’s being killed, tortured or
raped – is prevented.
Harris regards GM as ‘horrific’ ([1]: 92), but he
wildly exaggerates its impact on human subjects. He
writes: ‘It would… have prevented anyone … from
learning frommoral mistakes’ ([1]: 99). That is not true:
as remarked, it would only prevent people from perpe-
trating acts that are gravely wrong. They could learn
from perpetrating lesser wrongs such as petty larceny
and tax evasion. We believe, however, that the results of
some immoral acts are so horrific that whatever people
can realistically learn from committing them, it is better
all things considered if these learning sessions are
prevented. Harris is fond of sprinkling his text with
quotations from literary authors, but they are all (with
the exception of some classical) British: Shakespeare,
Milton, Byron, Auden, and Golding. If his choice of
literature had been less chauvinistic, it might have in-
cluded Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov
and Ivan Karamazov’s diatribe against God. After tell-
ing a shocking story of a couple’s systematic abuse of
their little daughter, Ivan exclaims to his brother
Alyosha:
Do you understandwhy this infamymust be and is
permitted? Without it, I am told, man could not
have existed on earth, for he could not have
known good and evil. Why should he know that
diabolical good and evil when it costs so much?
(Bk. V, ch. 4, trans. Constance Garnett).
Perhaps this reading would have made Harris reluc-
tant to say with such assurance that ‘I do not for a
moment think Beveryone is much better off for the
absence of evil^’ ([1]: 105), like the torture of a child,
and that GMwhich prevents such evil is ‘a million times
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worse than Milton’s God’ ([1]: 105) who permits it for
the sake of the goodness of the freedom enjoyed in the
execution of this act.
Another exaggeration of his: ‘The proper analogy with
theGodMachine is selling or giving yourself into slavery’
([1]: 106). Not so, as should be clear by now, GM only
restricts freedom or ability to act to a small extent.
Compare with entering into a social contract which im-
poses laws on us. These laws restrict our freedom to some
extent, but in decent states our freedom is still so extensive
that we cannot properly be characterized as slaves. To be
sure, GM goes further than law and its enforcement: it
removes not merely the freedom to perform gravely im-
moral acts, but even the ability to do so. Literally, these
acts cannot be performed when GM is in operation,
whereas laws can be broken (at the risk of punishment).
This might be regarded as a greater interference in the
lives of people, but to our minds this is justified by the
horrific badness of the acts rendered impossible.
Harris asks: ‘How would the operations of this new
megalomaniac /GM/ be regulated, challenged, or even
reviewed?’ ([1]: 105) His point is that these procedures
are possible in liberal democracies. Although we did not
do so in our original article, it is possible to imagine that
GM is regularly reviewed by a democratically elected
assembly. For instance, there will be a number of types
of action which fall on the borderline between what
should prevented and what should be permitted. If some
of these act-types which are originally permitted start
being frequently committed, the case for preventing
them grows stronger. But some types of action should
be on the black list irrevocably, like killing and torturing
innocent and non-consenting people – and other types
should be on the white list irrevocably. If members of
the assembly were to be in the process of deciding to
change the status of the latter two types, GM should be
fixed to interfere with such a reclassification. This cer-
tainly sets limits to democracy, but remember democra-
cy is not infallible: notoriously, in Germany in 1933
Adolf Hitler was democratically elected.
Clearly, by inventing GM we have managed to pro-
voke Harris who is known as a great provocateur; so
presumably more conventional people will find GM
evenmore provocative. Why is that? It might be instruc-
tive to compare GM with the Christian God, whose
(alleged) existence many seem comfortable with. One
feature of GM that people might find disturbing is that it
monitors the minds of all people and, thus, has complete
knowledge of what goes on in them. This might seem to
constitute a gross violation of a right to privacy. But the
same would be true of an omniscient God, and yet the
complaint that God violates the right to privacy is never
heard. In fact, if human persons have a right to privacy,
which God would necessarily violate in virtue of being
omniscient, it would be inconsistent to assume that God
is also perfectly good, or all-good. So, perhaps the right
to privacy should be rejected (see [2]: 53–6). But then
GM must be acquitted on the score of violation of a
putative right to privacy.
In virtue of being omnipotent, God would also be
endowed with a power to block decisions to perform
morally atrocious actions, like torturing and killing chil-
dren, but in contrast to GM, God would never make use
of this power. Thus, a difference between God and GM
would be that God could never be accused of violating
any right to autonomy. But a right to autonomy should
not be thought to extend so far as to encompass a right to
perform morally atrocious acts. Therefore, presumably
like IvanKaramazov, we think that the fact GMprevents
such acts counts in its favour. The possible goodness of
the freedom their exercise might involve is vanishingly
small in comparison to their harmfulness for the victims.
So, we still have not found any reason why people –
and there are billions of them – who are comfortable
with the belief that something like the Christian God
exists should be uncomfortable with the idea of GM. It
might be replied that, whereas God is incorruptibly
perfectly good, GMmight malfunction and wreak havoc
on human lives. Thus, we cannot wholly trust GM as we
can wholly trust God. But the fact that God allows
morally outrageous behaviour to occur, such as the
torture of innocent children, is a reason to believe that
God is not perfectly good – this is the well-known
problem of theodicy. Who knows what a God who
allows such atrocious behaviour – not tomention natural
catastrophes – could do in the future? After all, if God
will never interfere with human freedom, presumably
He will not interfere with the rogue psychopath, ideo-
logue or fanatic bent on destroying humanity, a power
such a person could easily acquire. Perhaps GM would
be after all more reliable. The comparison of GM with
the Christian God, then, does not dissolve the mystery of
why people are so provoked by the idea of GM.
Now we do not think that GM is likely to become a
reality in the foreseeable future, if ever. The point of
contemplating a scenario featuring it is to find out
whether there is anything that could rationally justify
the negative gut reaction most of us are prone to have to
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it. After all, we think it is a good thing to anticipate
criminal actions, e.g. terror attacks, and nip them in the
bud, and GM is a particularly effective way of doing
that. Nor do we think, contrary to what Harris assumes
([1]: 136), that the development and distribution of
biomedical means of moral enhancement are an ‘easy’
way to avert the disasters that threaten humankind. We
espouse the way of MB because, though long and
difficult, it may be necessary to this end.
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